


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
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2 June 1967

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# *Central Intelligence Bulletin*

## CONTENTS

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
Nigeria: Federal government invasion of East appears to be increasingly likely. (Page 7)

Rhodesia-Britain: Smith said to be willing to reach settlement. (Page 8)

Sudan: Political situation (Page 9)

25X1

**Next 8 Page(s) In Document Exempt**



2 Jun 67 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Map

25X1

Nigeria: [A federal military effort to thwart the East's secession appears to be increasingly likely.]

[British officials in Nigeria believe that federal head Gowon is planning a move either directly against Enugu, the Eastern capital, or into the minority tribal area along the East's border with Cameroon. There are reports that the remainder of the Northern-manned 2d Battalion is moving from Kaduna to reinforce its two companies already deployed near the border with the East.]

[Any such invasion of the East would probably encounter immediate difficulties because of the federal army's logistical deficiencies and because the Eastern Army would be fighting on home ground and terrain favorable for defense. Should Gowon delay until after the heavy rains begin--normally in June--his troops would encounter even greater problems.]

[The British are gearing up their contingency planning and have already dispatched a commando carrier to lie off Lagos in order to evacuate British nationals, if necessary. London is inclined to delay evacuation as long as possible both because of British business interests in the East and for fear of provoking hostile action against British nationals.]

[The East's "Republic of Biafra" has not yet been recognized by any country. Most nations outside Africa appear to be waiting for African countries to make the first move. The USSR has adopted a restrained attitude. Pravda and Tass have reported Eastern secession noncommittally, blaming British and US oil interests for at least some of the friction.]

[Western Nigeria's Yoruba leaders are lying low, perhaps hoping that Gowon will fail in any military operation against the East and thus be less able to deal with the Yorubas' aspirations to govern themselves.]

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2 Jun 67

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Rhodesia-Britain: [Prime Minister Smith reportedly will soon tell Britain that he is willing to reach a settlement based on his talks with Prime Minister Wilson last December.]

25X1 [ ] Smith is now willing to sack some of his more right-wing cabinet ministers--one of Wilson's conditions last December.]

[There is no indication, however, of the interim governmental arrangements he would be willing to accept, including the extent of British control pending the drafting of a final constitution--the major stumbling block in the earlier Smith-Wilson talks. Smith almost certainly would not agree to all the arrangements Wilson demanded.]

[An offer by Smith would put Wilson in a difficult position. In addition to any compromises he might have to make on the question of interim British control, Wilson would have to drop his ostensible commitment to the achievement of majority rule in Rhodesia before independence. His economic advisers and the Foreign Office almost certainly would back him in a compromise with Smith, as would most of the British public and the opposition Conservative Party. Wilson probably could control any rebellion within his own party, but he might not wish just now to revive the dormant Rhodesian issue and thus add to the growing list of grievances nursed by his party's left wing.]

[British refusal to reopen negotiations would contribute to extremist pressure within Rhodesia to close all doors to future talks. Smith probably can contain such pressure now, but there have been some recent indications of growing right-wing militancy.]

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2 Jun 67

8

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NOTE

Sudan: [The Sudanese political situation remains unsettled. Sadiq al-Mahdi, who resigned as prime minister on 15 May, is reported to be gathering support for a show of strength in the Constituent Assembly to embarrass the new prime minister, Muhammad Mahjub. According to Sadiq, many political factions are dissatisfied with Mahjub's coalition cabinet, formed on 27 May, in which the pro-Egyptian People's Democratic Party gained a disproportionate number of posts. The make-up of the cabinet indicates that the foreign policies of the new government will be less moderate than those of its predecessor.]

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2 Jun 67

9

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## NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATES

The United States Intelligence Board on 1 June 1967 approved the following national intelligence estimates:

NIE 11-67 "Soviet Military Research and Development" [REDACTED]

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SNIE 11-6-67, "Soviet Intentions and Strategy in the Mediterranean Basin" [REDACTED]

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2 Jun 67

10

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